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Book Review 
Nathan Widder, Reflections on Time and Politics (State 
College: Penn State University Press, 2008), 208 pp. 
Mired as we are in a global political situation in which the ideals and 
institutions that have been the proud heritage of the western philosophical 
tradition seem submerged by the inexorable pressures of global capital, it is 
not surprising that the inheritors of this tradition have increasingly turned to 
its most trenchant critics for insight into what possibilities might remain to 
it. Widder‟s Reflections joins an increasing number of such efforts. 
Challenging the form of this submergence structured by the temporal 
distortions of globalization and information technology, Widder looks to 
Deleuze‟s ontology of sense, and its virtual and actual allies, for an account 
of time, change, and identity which could make possible a different ethics 
and a different politics. In a series of sophisticated readings of traditional 
and contemporary theorists of the temporal and onotological conditions of 
ethics and politics, Widder argues convincingly for the advantages of a 
Deleuzian ontology of sense as a response to the onto-logics characteristic of 
the political traditions which seem to have failed. Moreover, he specifies the 
support that Deleuze‟s work provides for attempts to rethink categories of 
practice and political identity that escape the gravity of the metaphysical 
tradition. If, in the final analysis, questions still remain about the adequacy 
of the resources offered to politics by an account of identity as a simulation, 
the fault is not Widder‟s. He offers the reader a challenging, thoughtful work 
that rewards careful attention. 
Widder‟s work is fitted to its subject matter. The eighteen chapters are a 
set of punctual meditations on a diverse, if not wholly surprising, set of 
philosophers and themes. Like many works with an expansive range, 
Widder‟s moves quickly, encapsulating sophisticated expositions and 
contestations in a mere 178 pages. The occasional breathlessness of his 
discussions is mitigated somewhat by his reliance on Deleuze‟s more 
expansive treatment of the philosophers and topics discussed. One obstacle 
to an appreciation of the sophistication of Widder‟s discussions is the 
apparent lack of an overarching interpretive scheme. Though his 
introduction helpfully articulates the book‟s ambitions, it does little to 
prepare the reader for the terrain to follow. Here too, however, the 
indebtedness of Widder to Deleuze‟s works, particularly Difference and 
Repetition and The Logic of Sense, aids the reader in negotiating the 
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heterogeneity. Though it is not marked explicitly in Widder‟s text, the often 
startling shifts from figure to figure and question to question repeat in many 
instances the development of Deleuze‟s books. For example, Widder‟s 
discussion of Deleuzes‟s treatment of the three syntheses of time in Difference 
and Repetition is preceeded by chapters that retrace and expand on Deleuze‟s 
analysis of “Difference in Itself.” Readers familiar with Deleuze‟s work can 
thus discern in Widder‟s progress an internal, albeit parasitical, logic that 
would not be readily apparent to a more casual reader. 
This discernment is important for an appreciation of Widder‟s aims. His 
discussion of the three syntheses serves as a crucial link between the 
conjunctive subjects of the book. This conjunction is marked for Widder by 
Deleuze‟s identification of the three temporal syntheses with Freud‟s 
metapsychology, and in particular of the third, ungrounding temporal 
synthesis with the superego, and thus with the death instinct. The problem 
for Deleuze, as Widder recounts it, is that Freud thematizes this instinct 
materially, and thus purely personally, and as a result fails to encounter the 
full sense of ungrounding in an impersonal death (96). In other words, 
Freud‟s analysis remains wedded to an account of identity accomplished in 
and through opposition. This ultimately requires an account of ethics 
similarly committed. As readers of Deleuze are well aware, Deleuze himself 
calls for an ethics that contests this link, demanding in Widder‟s terms an, 
“affirmation of a cracked self in a world of multiplicity” (97), and thus an 
ethics of non-identity. This, suggests Widder, is the signficance of Deleuze‟s 
famous insistence in The Logic of Sense that ethics, to the extent that the term 
makes any sense, is a call “not to be unworthy of what happens to us” (97). 
Like many Deleuzians, Widder is at some pains to insist that ethics thus 
understood is not a form of resignation or solipsism, but rather an 
acknowledgment that, contrary to the traditon represented here by Freud, 
“The significance of events is thus that they expose the untimely crack 
within us that puts us out of joint with ourselves” (98). On this reading, 
Deleuzian ethics is an affirmation of this untimely crack, which has the effect 
of depersonalizing the moral subject, of rejecting the refuge of an egoistic 
reduction of all suffering to my suffering, “…the condition of this ethical 
affirmation is that the „I,‟ the ego, must be taken far less seriously” (99). This 
condition is pivotal to Widder‟s project. 
This affirmation conditions Widder‟s work in at least two ways. First it 
is this condition which authorizes the development from Widder‟s 
recounting of the historical and theoretical underpinnings of Deleuze‟s 
treatment of time to the treatment of ethical and political identities as a 
simulation. Here too, familiarity with Deleuze‟s work, in this case The Logic 
of Sense, is helpful. Deleuze‟s insistence on ethics as a call “not to be 
unworthy,” comes as part of his attempt to specify the philosophical 
contributions of Stoicism, and it is to this contribution that Widder 
immediately turns. The key, as Widder reads Deleuze, is the Stoic inversion 
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of Platonism, an inversion that is accomplished as an ontology of surfaces. 
Freed by Deleuze of the remaining epistemological vestiges of Platonism, 
this ontology of surfaces becomes an ontology of sense characterized not by 
contradiction or opposition, but by disjunction and difference. For such an 
ontology, “identity is no more than a superficial effect” (107). It is a 
metaphysical illusion which encourages thought to leap into the apparent 
gap and fill it with unavoidable abstractions. Deleuzian ethics calls us to 
resist this illusion. Much of Widder‟s book is devoted to providing the 
resources for this resistance.  
However, this resistance exhausts neither the ethical demand imposed 
on us by Deleuze nor Widder‟s project. The demand to take the „I‟ less 
seriously conditions this project secondly in the form of a question that 
Widder cannot avoid. If ethics calls us to take these illusory identities less 
seriously, are we not forced as a result to take ethics, and by extension 
politics (an extension which is certainly questionable but which Widder 
barely questions), less seriously? Though clearly an „ethics‟ or a „politics‟ 
submissive to the gravity of metaphysics may be dimissable, Widder insists 
that this Deleuzian demand is consistent with another „ethics‟ or „politics.‟ 
At this juncture, Widder‟s reliance on Deleuze gives way to extended 
discussions of Foucault and, primarily for his diagnosis of our contemporary 
political situation, Adorno. This move is anticipated by Widder with a short 
chapter focused on Foucault‟s Archeology of Knowledge which seeks to 
establish the proximity of the dispersion characteristic of discursive 
formations with the mixed character of Stoic surfaces. As Widder highlights, 
what is missing, though anticiapted, in the analysis of discursive formations 
is an account of the generative capacitites of power revealed in Foucault‟s 
genealogical analyses. Thus, in the final chapters of the book, Widder seeks 
to correct common misreadings of the significance of these analyses by 
reading them together with Nietzschean overcoming and Deleuzian 
micropolitics, thereby establishing the consistency of Foucault‟s analysis of 
power with the temporal and ontological ungrounding of the 
ethical/political demand. Revealed in this consistencey, according to 
Widder, is a negative answer to the unavoidable question. Widder finds in 
Foucault‟s attempt in Volume One of The History of Sexuality to play the 
game of truth otherwise (184) the possibility of taking ethics and politics 
seriously by refusing to take the “moral subject” seriously (185-6). 
Without denying the legitimacy of Widder‟s employment of Foucault to 
realize the exigencies of a Deleuzian demand for a „serious‟ ethics and 
politics that refuses the illusory seriousness of the metaphysics of the 
subject, one can still wonder what is gained by the effort. In Widder‟s 
analysis, “what emerges is a micropolitical domain of ethical negotiation 
where what matters is not the ability to construct an identity but rather the 
capacity for revaluations that move us beyond crude oppositions…[a] 
positivity of power, discourse, and the self which sustains relationality but 
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moves it from the negativity of a still abstract opposition toward an 
immanent multiplicity” (188). On the assumption that such a domain and 
such a positivity are legitimate, even necessary, political aims, at least two 
questions still remain. First, does Foucault need Deleuze? That is, what if 
anything is actually gained by deploying the machinery of the Deleuzian 
ontology of sense with its refiguring of temporality? If the politics we are left 
with is thinkable without it, much of the force of Widder‟s work, with the 
exception perhaps of supplementing Deleuze‟s philosophy with a desirable 
politics, is lost. Secondly, is what Foucault offers us enough? Widder himself 
seems to suggest that even Foucaultians are unconvinced when he 
complains that they have not taken Foucault‟s suggestions seriously (157n1, 
187). However, perhaps it is this lack of conviction that Widder is seeking to 
correct, and in this light, supplementing Foucault with Deleuze may be the 
best way to appreciate what Widder has accomplished. Regardless, 
Reflections on Time and Politics is a worthy addition to the growing body of 
work that acknowledges the conceptual and political crisis that we find 
ourselves in, work which is, without doubt, among the signal tasks of those 
still committed to philosophy. 
Philip J. (Max) Maloney 
Christian Brothers University 
 
